Theorem Proving and Partial Proof Search for Intuitionistic Propositional Logic Using a Permutation-free Calculus with Loop-Checking

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Priority, Not Equality, for Possible People

How should we choose between uncertain prospects in which different possible people might exist at different levels of wellbeing? Alex Voorhoeve and Marc Fleurbaey offer an egalitarian answer to this question. I give some reasons to reject their answer and then sketch an alternative, which I call person-affecting prioritarianism

Hopes, Fears, and Other Grammatical Scarecrows

The standard view of "believes" and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “S believes that p” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p; this proposition is the referent of the complement clause "that p." On this view, we would expect the clausal complements of propositional attitude verbs to be freely intersubstitutable with their corresponding proposition descriptions—e.g., "the proposition that p"—as they are in the case of "believes." In many cases, however, intersubstitution of that-clauses and proposition descriptions fails to preserve truth value or even grammaticality. These substitution failures lead some philosophers to reject the standard view of propositional attitude reports. Others conclude that propositional attitude verbs are systematically ambiguous. I reject both these views. On my view, the that-clause complements of propositional attitude verbs denote propositions, but proposition descriptions do not

Normative Reasons as Reasons Why We Ought

I defend the view that a reason for someone to do something is just a reason why she ought to do it. This simple view has been thought incompatible with the existence of reasons to do things that we may refrain from doing or even ought not to do. For it is widely assumed that there are reasons why we ought to do something only if we ought to do it. I present several counterexamples to this principle and reject some ways of understanding "ought" so that the principle is compatible with my examples. I conclude with a hypothesis for when and why the principle should be expected to fail

Totalism without Repugnance

Totalism is the view that one distribution of well-being is better than another just in case the one contains a greater sum of well-being than the other. Many philosophers, following Parfit, reject totalism on the grounds that it entails the repugnant conclusion: that, for any number of excellent lives, there is some number of lives that are barely worth living whose existence would be better. This paper develops a theory of welfare aggregation—the lexical-threshold view—that allows totalism to avoid the repugnant conclusion, as well as its analogues involving suffering populations and the lengths of individual lives. The theory is grounded in some independently plausible views about the structure of well-being, identifies a new source of incommensurability in population ethics, and avoids some of the implausibly extreme consequences of other lexical views, without violating the intuitive separability of lives

Rank-Weighted Utilitarianism and the Veil of Ignorance

Lara Buchak argues for a version of rank-weighted utilitarianism that assigns greater weight to the interests of the worse off. She argues that our distributive principles should be derived from the preferences of rational individuals behind a veil of ignorance, who ought to be risk averse. I argue that Buchak’s appeal to the veil of ignorance leads to a particular way of extending rank-weighted utilitarianism to the evaluation of uncertain prospects. This method recommends choices that violate the unanimous preferences of rational individuals and choices that guarantee worse distributions. These results, I suggest, undermine Buchak’s argument for rank-weighted utilitarianism

The Good, the Bad, and the Transitivity of _Better Than_

The Rachels–Temkin spectrum arguments against the transitivity of better than involve good or bad experiences, lives, or outcomes that vary along multiple dimensions—e.g., duration and intensity of pleasure or pain. This paper presents variations on these arguments involving combinations of good and bad experiences, which have even more radical implications than the violation of transitivity. These variations force opponents of transitivity to conclude that something good is worse than something that isn’t good, on pain of rejecting the good altogether. That is impossible, so we must reject the spectrum arguments

An Intrapersonal Addition Paradox

I present a new argument for the repugnant conclusion. The core of the argument is a risky, intrapersonal analogue of the mere addition paradox. The argument is important for three reasons. First, some solutions to Parfit’s original puzzle do not obviously generalize to the intrapersonal puzzle in a plausible way. Second, it raises independently important questions about how to make decisions under uncertainty for the sake of people whose existence might depend on what we do. And, third, it suggests various difficulties for leading views about the value of a person’s life compared to her nonexistence

Maintaining an ethical balance in the curriculum design of games-based degrees.

In February 2011, games-based degrees were subjected to the scrutiny of the Livingstone- Hope report into the future of education in the fields of video games and visual effects. The report delivers a damning appraisal of the education system’s ability to fulfil skills shortages in these creative industries, and makes a range of proposals for changing education in both schools and universities to meet the needs of these sectors. This paper discusses the findings of this report from the perspective of higher education, with particular emphasis on the complex ethical considerations of designing a curriculum for games-based degrees. The argument for taking a broader perspective on this issue is illustrated through discussion of Games Software Development degrees at Sheffield Hallam University

B cell reductive therapy with rituximab in the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis.

The approach to treating autoimmune disorders is currently undergoing a significant change in focus. As therapies are developed that are more precise in targeting the pathogenesis for these diseases, patients experience significantly fewer side effects. At the same time, as more precise therapies are discovered, the etiologies of these diseases become further elucidated. It is now widely accepted that B-lymphocytes play a significant role in the pathogenesis of various autoimmune diseases, the extent of which continues to be the focus of ongoing research. Rheumatoid arthritis is one such disease process that has been the focus of various B-lymphocyte-directed therapeutic trials. In this paper we review the current research available on rituximab as treatment for rheumatoid arthritis. This review details results from four main studies, as well as others, which used rituximab in at least one of the arms in treatment of rheumatoid arthritis. The results are promising and will likely lead to longer term studies as well as a potential focus on B cell subsets